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COMMENTS
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION OF
REVERSIONARY INTERESTS
Section 811 of the Internal Revenue Code relating to federal estate
taxes contains the following provision:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all
property ...
(c) ... To the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise ... intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death ...
This clause has been a part of the federal estate tax law since
its first enactment in 1916, but it lost much of its vitality as a source
of federal estate tax revenue in 1930 when the United States Supreme
Court held transfers retaining a life estate were not intended to fall
within the provision.2
In 1940, however, the Supreme Court revifalized the provision
when it decided Helvering v. Hallock,3 the leading case on "possibility
of reverter". In that case the decedent in 1919 created an inter vivos
trust giving the trust income to his wife for life with the further
provision that at her death the trust should terminate and the corpus
revert to the decedent if he be still living, if not, to his daughters.
It was held that the value of the corpus was includable in the decedent's gross estate under section 811 (c). 4 The possibility that the
corpus might revert to the decedent in the event his wife predeceased
him withheld the absolute vesting of the estate in remainder in his
daughters until decedent's death, and this was held to be a transfer
intended not to take effect absolutely in possession and enjoyment until
at or after death as contemplated by the statute.
2Sec. 811 (c), Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended; 26 U.S.C.A. 811 (c).
2 May v. Heiner, 281 U. S.238, 74 L. Ed. 826, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1930) ; Burnet v.
Northern Trust Co.. 283 U.S. 782, 75 L. Ed. 1412, 51 S. Ct. 343 (1931). Most
of the state courts, however, had construed their respective inheritance tax acts
containing similar provisions as including transfers retaining a life interest,
and the United States Supreme Court sustained such constructions as not
violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U. S.509, 77 L. Ed. 463, 53 S.Ct. 244 (1933) ; Matter
of Brandreth, 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 563 (1902) ; Matter of Green, 153 N. Y.
223, 47 N. E. 292, (1897); In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N. W.
459 (1932); 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 168 (1926); 38 Yale L. J. 657 (1929); 49 A.
L. R. 874, 878 (1927) ; 67 A. L. R. 1247 (1930). In 1931 a Joint Resolution of
Congress amended the estate tax law to include transfers wherein a life interest is retained. Fn. 1, Supra.
3
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S.106, 84 L. Ed. 604, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940).
4 Sec. 811 (c) of the present I.R.C. was referred to in the opinion as Sec.
302 (c), its designation in the Revenue Act of 1926.
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The Court, in 1931, had sustained a similar application of the
statute in the Klein case 5 where the language of the instrument of
transfer retained the remainder interest in the decedent, transferring
it only upon the happening of the condition precedent that he predecease the life tenant. The problem resolved by the Hallock case
arose when the St. Louis Trust cases8 were decided in 1935. In those
two cases the Court refused to allow the tax because the trust deeds
effecting the transfer in question were so worded as to presently
transfer the remainders, subject to being divested later if the persoR
receiving the income should predecease the grantor, in which case
the corpus would revert to the grantor. In the Hallock case, the
Court recognized that in substance the difference between the instrument of transfer in the Klein case and the trust deeds in the St. Louis
Trust cases amounted to "a mere difference in phrasing the circumstance by which identic interests in property were brought into
being . . .", The St. Louis Trust cases were overruled, and the rule
established that if, in substance, a "possibility of reverter"8 is retained,
the transfer is one intended to take effect at or after death of the
grantor, regardless of where the verbiage of the instrument places it
under property law classifications.
The doctrine of the Hallock case was followed in three principle
eases; viz, Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Company v. Rothensies, Commissioner v. Estate of Field, and Goldstone v. United States.9 In the
Rothensies case the doctrine was applied to a retained possibility of
a power of appointment. In the Field case it was applied to a transfer
in trust, income to the grantor during the lives of two nieces, with reverter of the corpus to the grantor if he should survive the nieces.
In the Goldstone case it was applied to a possibility of reverter of
interest in insurance contracts.
In these cases a serious question was raised as to the scope of
Helvering v. Hallock in that the Court used language which seems to
sweep into the pr6vision all possibilities of reverter existing at the
time of death, no matter how remote, and regardless of whether or
5Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231, 75 L. Ed. 996, 51 S. Ct. 398 (1931).
6Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, 80 L. Ed. 29, 56 S. Ct.
74 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 80 L. Ed. 35, 56 S.
Ct. 78 (1935).
7 Helvering v. Hallock, Fn. 3, supra, 309 U. S. 106, pg. 114.
8The phrase "possibility of reverter" has frequently been used in writings on
the Hallock doctrine, and is so used herein, as including all reversionary interests. Technically, a possibility of reverter is only that type of reversionary

interest subject to a condition precedent. Restatement of the Law of property,
154 (1)e.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U. S. 108, 89 L. Ed.
782, 65 S. Ct. 508 (1945); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of
Field, 324 U. S. 113, 89 L. Ed. 786, 65 S. Ct. 511 (1945) ; Goldstone v. United
States, 325 U. S. 687, 89 L. Ed. 1871, 65 S. Ct. 1323 (1945).
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not the interest transferred could be obtained only by beneficiaries
surviving the decedent.
In Commissioner v. Estate of Field, the Court said,
"It makes no difference how vested may be the remainder interests in the corpus or how remote or uncertain may be the
decedent's reversionary interest.' If the corpus does not shed
the possibility of reversion until at or after the decedent's
death, the value of the entire corpus on the date of death is
taxable."'
While this was mere dictum as to the point in question in the
case, the language raises a serious doubt as to just how far the
doctrine of the Hallock case might be extended. It was unquestionably
broad enough to include any transfer under which the decedent has
a possibility of reaquisition, whether the grantor intended the grantee
to survive him before acquiring full dominion of the property or not.
That the Court went just that far seems clear from a consideration
of Goldstone v. United States. That case involved a transfer by a
decedent to his wife of all the powers of ownership in two paid up
insurance contracts, the decedent being the insured and his wife and
daughters the primary and secondary beneficiaries, respectively. The
contracts contained a provision that if the wife predeceased the decedent, all the aforementioned powers of ownership would return
to the decedent; and if both wife and daughters predecease him, the
proceeds would be payable to his estate. Upon this latter provision
the application of the doctrine of the Hallock case was based. In
commenting on the wife's complete power to destroy the decedent's
reverter interest by assignment or surrender of the contracts, the
Court said,
"The indefeasability of that interest prior to death or the decedent's possession of other powers of ownership is unnecessary
and indecisive of estate tax liability."' 2
Justice Roberts saw the implications of such an extensive application of the Hallock doctrine to what he was convinced was a complete gift, when he said in his vigorous dissent,
"I think it demonstrable that the transaction as respects the
beneficiary, his wife, was no different in substance or effect
than an outright gift of money or property to her. I cannot
distinguish this case from one in which a husband, not in
contemplation of death, conveys money or property, real or
personal, in fee simple to his wife or to any other relative. For,
in such case, all, or a portion of the property, may, upon death
10 Italics the writer's.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Field, Fn. 9, supra, 324 U. S.
113, Pg. 116.
12 Goldstone v. United States, Fn 9, supra, 325 U.S. 687, pg. 692. Italics the writer's.
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of the donee, descend to the donor under the intestate laws,
and both parties to the transaction know this to be the fact. Notwithstanding then that, under the law, the wife may, until her
death, spend, convey, mortgage, or dispose of the property, I
suppose it will be held that, inasmuch as all or some of it will
descend to him if she omits so to do; he will be held, within
the meaning of the statute, to have made a conveyance to take
effect at his death because the only way he can avoid inheriting
it from the donee is to die...
"The so-called 'string' which he retained upon the property
n
need not have the quality of a tie that binds.""
The unsettled state of the law and confusion resulting from the
broad language quoted above has now been dispelled by a clear cut
amendatory regulation promulgated by the Treasury Department on
May 1, 1946'4 which reads,'in part, as follows:
"The value of such property interests [i.e. property transferred
inter vivos, by trust or otherwise, subject to a possibility of
reverter]1 5 is includible in his gross estate, if
(1) possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest
can be obtained -only by beneficiaries who must survive the
decedent, and
(2) the decedent or his estate possesses any right or interest in the property (whether arising by the express terms
of the instrument of transfer or otherwise)."
This regulation clearly places a limitation on how far the above
noted decisions will be carried. The doctrine of the Hallock case may
only be applied when the beneficiary is required to survive the decedent
to obtain possession and enjoyment. Suvirvorship is the test and not
merely that the possibility of reverter is not snuffed out until at or
after death.
The regulation states eight hypothetical applications of the test,
the eighth example indicating that the result of the Goldstone case
would no longer obtain. The illustration is of a transfer in trust
retaining a possibility of reverter in the settlor if the beneficiaries fail
to survive him. It was further provided, however, that the settlor's
wife would have the unrestricted power to alter, amend, or revoke
the trust. In reference to the new regulation's provision requiring
survivorship, it is stated that,
"the first requirement is not satisfied, since the wife can obtain possession or enjoyment of the property during the decedent's lifetime through the exercise of her power to alter,
"4 Goldstone v. United States, Fn. 9, supra, 325 U. S. 687, pg. 694.

2 Regulations 105, Section 81.17, as amended by Treasury Decision 5512, (May
1,1946).
26 Comment in brackets supplied by writer.
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amend, or revoke. No part of the property is, therefore, includible in the decedent's gross estate."' 6
No distinction is perceived between these powers and those given
the decedent's wife in the Goldstone case. It appears that the construction contended for by Justice Roberts' dissent would now be
reached under the new regulation, except when the person possessing
absolute power to cut off a transferor's possibility of reverter dies
without exercising the power, and the remaining beneficiaries are required to survive the transferor to prevent a reversion, "survivorship"
again being controlling.
While the new regulation settles the question as to survivorship,
it leaves open the question of remoteness of the possibility of reverter. The problem may be made clearer by an illustration. Let us
suppose that a transfer in trust is made by A at ninety years of age,
income for life to B who is fifty years of age, remainedr to C,
twenty-five years of age, if he survives A, if not, to D, two years of
age, if he survives A, if not, trust to terminate and the corpus to
revert to A if he be still living, or, if not living, to his heirs at law.
The only way the trust corpus could revert to A under the above
situation would be if A should survive B, C, and D, a highly improbable
result. Yet, assuming that the transfer escapes taxation under the "contemplation of death" clause,' 7 it would be taxable under the decisions
and the regulations as they now stand. 18
Legislative action may be taken to prevent the result illustrated
above. H.R. 5358, now introduced in Congress, 9 would require the
inclusion of a transferred property interest in the gross estate only
if it might have reverted to the decedent "in the normal course of
events."" Such a provision in the statute would raise other questions
requiring further interpretation as to just where the line should be
drawn, but it certainly would prevent taxability in the not too uncommon instance illustrated.
The problem of the gift tax in "possibility of reverter" cases remains for consideration. Many tax-payers will want to dispose of
retained possibilities of reverter and the question arises - will such
disposition subject them to a gift tax?
16Fn. 14, supra, Example (8).
17 Fn. I, supra.

"It makes no difference ... how remote ... may be the decedent's reversionary
interest." Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Field, Fn. 9, supra,
324 U. S. 113, pg. 116.
19 Introduced Feb. 4, 1946 in the House of Representatives and referred to the
Ways and Means Committee; Alexander Tax News Letter #31, February
9, 1946.
18

20
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Upon the strength of Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner,2 which
strongly intimated that estate taxes and gift taxes were mutually exclusive except in cases of gifts in contemplation of death, it was for
a time generally believed that no gift tax was payable on the original
transfer in cases where possibilities of reverter were retained. However the decisions in Smith v. Shaughnessy22 and Robinette v Helvering2 3 dispelled any such belief. In these two cases it was held
that the gift taxes and estate taxes were not mutually exclusive in
cases of possibility of reverter. The gift tax was payable on the
original transfer, but the value of the transferred property was to be
diminished by the value of the retained interest because the gift was
2 4
complete except for the retained possibility of reverter.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that the gift tax will be payable
on relinquishment of a possibility of reverter, it being an interest in
property of value, and that the method of valuation will be the
actuarial measure employed in these cases.
JoHN BoYLE

21308 U. S. 39, 84 L. Ed. 20, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939).
22 318 U. S. 176, 87 L. Ed. 690, 63 S. Ct: 545 (1943).
23 318 U. S. 184, 87 L. Ed. 700, 63 S. Ct. 540 (1943).

24 "We conclude that under the present statute, Congress has provided as it's

plan for integrating the estate and gift taxes thi's system of secured payments
on gifts which will later- be subject to the estate tax." Smith v. Shaughnessy,
318 U. S. 176, pg. 179.

